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Abstract 
Completion of the final Space Shuttle flight marks the end of a significant era in Human 
Spaceflight. Developed in the 1970’s, first launched in 1981, the Space Shuttle embodies many 
significant engineering achievements. One of these is the development and operation of the first 
extensive fly-by-wire human space transportation Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) 
System. Development of the Space Shuttle GN&C represented first time inclusions of modern 
techniques for electronics, software, algorithms, systems and management in a complex system. 
Numerous technical design trades and lessons learned continue to drive current vehicle 
development. For example, the Space Shuttle GN&C system incorporated redundant systems, 
complex algorithms and flight software rigorously verified through integrated vehicle simulations 
and avionics integration testing techniques. Over the past thirty years, the Shuttle GN&C 
continued to go through a series of upgrades to improve safety, performance and to enable the 
complex flight operations required for assembly of the international space station. Upgrades to the 
GN&C ranged from the addition of nose wheel steering to modifications that extend capabilities to 
control of the large flexible configurations while being docked to the Space Station. This paper 
provides a history of the development and evolution of the Space Shuttle GN&C system. Emphasis 
is placed on key architecture decisions, design trades and the lessons learned for future complex 
space transportation system developments. Finally, some of the interesting flight operations 
experience is provided to inform future developers of flight experiences. 
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I.   Introduction 
 The Space Transportation System (STS) or Shuttle is comprised of the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), and Solid 
Rocket Boosters (SRB). It is my far the most unique and technologically challenging vehicle developed for safely 
transporting humans and cargo (payload bay is 60 ft by 15 ft) to and from Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Weighing in at 
over 4.5 million pounds at liftoff, the Shuttle was designed to be reusable except for the external tank, perform 
complex on-orbit operations including rendezvous and docking, mated Orbiter/Space Station control, then de-orbit 
and execute a non-powered precision landing at 200 knots. One key system that contributed to the thirty year Shuttle 
success story is the GN&C system. Design and implementation of a robust Shuttle GN&C system capable of 
performing all mission phases was an engineer's dream challenge. Consequently, the Space Shuttle GN&C system is 
one of the most complex ever developed requiring an extensive GN&C system with an array of sensors, flight 
software algorithms and actuation systems. Even though the challenge began in the 1970’s it did not cease after the 
first flight. GN&C evolution continued nearly the entire thirty years of operations due to flight experience 
revelations, ever-expanding on-orbit functions (space station, Hubble servicing, etc.), improving Orbiter 
performance, hardware obsolescence, and crew safety. Considering the multitude of GN&C system dependencies it 
is a remarkable achievement and testament to the engineers that took the challenge and created this flying wonder. 
Consider some of the challenges: airframe aerodynamics including large aero uncertainties in Mach regions with 
limited or no wind tunnel validation, the first fly-by-wire spacecraft, fail-op fail-safe (FO/FS) avionic architecture, 
limited aero surface actuator performance, reaction control system (RCS) sizing, limited general purpose computer 
(GPC) memory and throughput, 1970’s era precision sensor hardware, requirements to fly manually and in "auto", 
in-flight abort capability, a separate primary and backup flight system, and much more. The Shuttle GN&C system 
is truly an engineering wonder that extols ingenuity and projects the “can do spirit” for future engineers and their 
challenges. 
 
II.   Shuttle GN&C Compendium 
Understanding the GN&C system rudiments begins with comprehending the Shuttle/Orbiter configuration, 
mission and the resultant impacts on the GN&C design. From the instant the Shuttle launches the GN&C system is 
in active control through the three Orbiter Program Segments (OPS) and multiple Major Modes (MM) until wheel 
stop (illustrated in Figure II.1).   
Figure II.1: Flight Operation Sequence and Major Modes 
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Each MM utilizes a unique GN&C configuration based upon sensors, effectors, guidance and control requirements, 
and whether operating in auto or manual mode. Figure II.2 details some of the GN&C hardware and related 
hardware required to successfully operate the Shuttle. Navigation hardware includes: inertial measurement units 
(IMU’s), which sense vehicle orientation and accelerations; star trackers, determine vehicle line of sight vectors; 
Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS), allows the crew to manually determine line of sight vectors; Tactical Air 
Navigation (TACAN), determines vehicle position with respect to a ground based station; Global Positioning 
System (GPS), satellite ranging signals to determine orbiter position and velocity; air data system (ADS), which 
senses temperature and pressure; microwave scan beam landing system (MSBLS), determine slant range, azimuth 
and elevation to the ground stations 
alongside the landing runway; and radar 
altimeters. The flight control system 
hardware includes four accelerometer 
assemblies (AA’s), four orbiter rate gyro 
assemblies (RGA’s), four SRB rate gyro 
assemblies (SRGA’s), rotational and 
translational hand controllers, rudder 
pedal transducer assemblies, two 
speedbrake/thrust controllers, two body 
flap switches, panel trim switches, aero 
surface servo amplifiers, and ascent 
thrust vector control (TVC).  
            Figure II.2: Shuttle GN&C Hardware 
The digital autopilot (DAP) is the flight control software that generates commands for the appropriate effectors.  
There are different DAP’s for different flight phases: Transition DAP (TRANSDAP) becomes active at MECO and 
is used again for the deorbit burn until Entry Interface (EI) minus five minutes; orbit DAP includes an RCS DAP, an 
OMS TVC DAP, and an attitude processor module; Aerojet DAP is used from EI-5 until wheel stop. Flight control 
receives commands from guidance software or from the crew controllers (attitudes, rates, and accelerations) and 
converts them to effector commands. Flight control output commands are based on the difference between the 
commanded attitude, body rate, or body acceleration and the sensed attitude, rate, or acceleration. Sensed attitude is 
derived from inertial measurement unit (IMU) angles; body rates are sensed by rate gyro assemblies (RGAs); and 
accelerations are sensed by accelerometer assemblies (AAs). In addition, during atmospheric flight, flight control 
adjusts control sensitivity based on air data parameters derived from local pressures sensed by air data probes and 
performs turn coordination using body attitude angles derived from IMU angles. 
 The ascent flight phase (OPS 1) commences at liftoff (MM102) and ends with orbit insertion coast (MM106). 
Figure II.3 illustrates ascent/abort profiles. 
During ascent, Orbiter control and 
trajectory changes are made during 
powered flight by commands sent to the 
SRB and SSME thrust vector controllers 
(TVC). After main engine cutoff (MECO) 
control and trajectory corrections are made 
by commanding the OMS engines and RCS 
jets. Ascent first stage (MM102) duration is 
from liftoff till SRB jettison, approximately 
2 minutes, during which the open loop 
guidance computes attitude commands 
from a predetermined trajectory (attitude 
vs. velocity profile) based on a trajectory 
shaped for loads. The IMU’s provide the 
current vehicle state (position, velocity) to 
the guidance and flight control. Flight 
control receives the guidance attitude 
commands, sensor outputs and generates 
                              Figure II.3 Ascent/Abort Profiles                         actuator commands based on the attitude errors 
and desired body rates. Sensed acceleration is collected from the Orbiter’s four accelerometer assemblies (AA’s) 
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and body rates are collected from the four solid rocket booster rate gyro assemblies (SRGA’s). The SRGA’s are 
used during first stage because they are less susceptible to errors created by structural bending since the SRB’s are 
more rigid than the Orbiter body. At approximately 120 seconds after launch the SRB’s are jettisoned and MM103 
(second stage) begins. Second stage lasts approximately six and one half minutes and ends at main engine cutoff 
(MECO) and ET separation when MM104 begins. During second stage, guidance is closed loop generating 
commands to meet the MECO target condition via the guidance algorithm called “Powered Explicit Guidance”. The 
target conditions include cutoff velocity, radius from the Earth, flight path angle, orbital inclination, and longitude of 
the ascending node. Navigation and control remain the same as first stage with the exception of no longer 
commanding the SRB’s TVC. After MM103 completion the Orbiter continues its trajectory into LEO by either one 
or two burns of the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS). MM 104 (Orbit insertion), OMS–1 burn, is used to raise 
the orbiter energy to permission selected apogee altitude. For direct insertion ascent the OMS-1 burn is usually not 
required. MM 105 (orbit circularization), OMS 2 burn, raises the perigee altitude to create a circular orbit. 
TRANSDAP is used during orbit insertion, and de-orbit phase MM301-303, commanding the OMS TVC and the 
RCS jets to perform insertion and deorbit burns, attitude maneuvering and translational maneuvers, including 
separation of the Orbiter from the ET.  
During ascent, abort return to launch site (RTLS) and abort trans-Atlantic (TAL) are possible for predetermined 
failures. A specific set of guidance and control algorithms were developed for the different abort profiles. 
OPS 2 is the operational sequence for on-orbit operations (illustrated by Figure II.4). It is comprised of MM 201 
(orbit coast) and MM 202 (maneuver execute). MM 201 functionally monitors and controls the Orbiter during coast 
flight and experiment operations while MM 202 is used for maneuvering to OMS burn attitudes and orbital 
translations. During on orbit operations the navigation software propagates the Orbiter state vector using IMU data 
                  Figure II.4 On Orbit Major Modes            and models of atmospheric drag 
acceleration. Due to the accuracy of the 
IMU’s and modeled drag periodic 
updates are sent from Mission Control to 
correct for errors. During rendezvous 
operation rendezvous navigation utilizing 
data from the star tracker, crewman 
optical alignment sight (COAS) or 
rendezvous radar to compute the Orbiter 
target state vector. Orbiter control and 
maneuvering is maintained through the 
use of the RCS jets, OMS engines, and 
the smaller vernier jets.  
 OPS 3 is the operational sequence for 
deorbit, entry and landing (illustrated by Figure II.5). The deorbit phase includes the deorbit burn preparations 
(MM301), loading of burn targets and maneuvering to burn attitude; execution and monitoring of the burn 
(MM302); reconfiguration after the burn; and a coast mode (MM303) until entry interface (EI ~ 400,000 ft altitude)       
                       Figure II. 5 De-Orbit Pre-Entry Major Modes         minus five minutes is reached (MM304). 
As mentioned previously the 
deorbit phase uses the 
TRANSDAP controller. 
Navigation uses the Super-G 
algorithm to propagate the orbiter 
state vector, based upon a drag 
model or IMU data. The entry 
phase (MM 304) of flight begins 
at EI minus five minutes and 
continues until terminal area 
energy management (TAEM) 
interface (MM305) is reached 
(Mach 2.5, Alt. ~ 83,000 ft). At an 
altitude of approximately 10,000 
ft. the flight phase changes to Approach and Landing (A/L), which continues until wheel stop. Nominal end of 
mission events are illustrated in figure II.6. Control is maintained by the aft reaction control system (RCS) until a 
sensed dynamic pressure of 2 psf where control is performed by blending RCS and elevator/aileron aerosurfaces. 
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During entry the forward RCS jets are inhibited as are the vernier jets. The body flap becomes active at a dynamic 
pressure of 0.5 psf. It used as a heat shield for the SSME bells and for pitch trim augmentation to support elevon 
deflection during high heating regions. Beginning with a dynamic pressure of 10 psf the roll jets are deactivated, at 
                                                      Figure II.6   Nominal End of Mission Events 
40 psf the pitch jets are deactivated, finally at Mach 1 the yaw jets are deactivated. The speedbrake becomes active 
at Mach 10 and is fully opened to augment pitch trim. It is used for energy control during heading alignment cone 
(HAC) flight and provides pitch moment augmentation during slap down. The guidance function varies depending 
on entry sub phases. During entry guidance commands a drag/acceleration profile based on temperature, dynamic 
pressure, angle of attack (alpha), and normal acceleration (Nz). It then generates roll angle and angle-of-attack 
commands for use by the flight control system. During TAEM the primary function of guidance is to manage the 
Orbiter’s energy in order to achieve the proper approach and landing (A/L) conditions. If the Orbiter is high on 
energy S-turns are commanded prior to HAC acquisition to dissipate the excess energy.  
                                                            Figures II.7,8 TAEM & A/L 
After HAC acquisition the guidance commands the Orbiter around the 
HAC to a point that is tangent to the runway centerline called the 
nominal energy point (NEP). The Orbiter continues towards the 
runway threshold and transitions to A/L phase when airspeed, altitude, 
flight path angle, and centerline corridor conditions are met. A/L 
guidance maintains the proper glide slope, speed, and tracks the runway centerline. At an altitude of 2,000 ft. the 
pre-flare pull up is commanded reducing the altitude rate form 200 ft/sec to 12 ft/sec. Final flare is initiated at an 
altitude between 30 ft to 80 ft reducing the sink rate to 3 ft/sec (illustrated in figures II.7,8). At main wheel 
touchdown the weight on wheels flag is set and just prior to de-rotation the drag chute is deployed. At nose gear 
touchdown the software transitions to rollout mode and active nose wheel steering is available. 
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III.   Development, The Early Years 
The early years of the Shuttle GN&C development covers the period form initial development in the early 
seventies through the initial flights in the early eighties until the Challenger Accident. During this period substantial 
advancements were made to incorporate the current technologies of the time to achieve the extensive requirements 
necessary for a digital fly-by-wire reusable space vehicle including ascent, orbit and entry, descent and landing 
flight operations. 
Crew safety and mission success were primary design drivers resulting in an architecture that supports a FO/FS 
philosophy. In addition, the architecture incorporated manual and auto mode flight control systems, an independent 
Backup Flight System (BFS), digital fly-by-wire, abort capability, and redundant management system that could 
detect faults, identify the faults and reconfigure (FDIR) the system. To meet the FO/FS requirement a four-string 
avionics architecture was developed. The immediate GN&C impact meant four redundant pieces of hardware, where 
possible, synced together with fault management logic. Exceptions were the three inertial measurement units (IMU), 
aero-surface actuators, switches, displays, hand controllers, and the BFS that is single string. The data processing 
system (DPS) is comprised of the primary flight system (PFS) and the BFS. The PFS is a quad redundant 
architecture utilizing a redundant set of four general-purpose computers (GPC’s) while the BFS is single string with 
its own dedicated GPC. NASA, Rockwell, Draper Laboratory and Honeywell developed the primary GN&C which 
was coded into software by IBM while Rockwell International and Draper Laboratory developed the BFS software. 
Independent programming was pursued to minimize potential generic programming errors that could result in 
complete loss of command and control capability. Due to limited GPC memory the entire flight software for ascent, 
on orbit, entry, and aborts could not be loaded in one seamless package. The work around was development of flight 
operational software loads (OPS) that are loaded onto the GPC’s for each flight phase. The GN&C is a true fly-by-
wire system with all command and control generated by the flight software. There is no direct command linkage to 
the controllers. The PFS digital autopilot (DAP) can operate in the auto mode or in control stick steering (CSS) also 
known as the manual mode. It can also mix the modes per control axis and function while BFS is solely operated in 
the CSS mode.  
 
Ascent GN&C 
 The ascent GN&C requirements can be simplified to “deliver the Orbiter” to: 1) desired orbit insertion 
conditions; 2) desired position and velocity for an abort landing; and 3) any stable orbit for an abort to orbit (AOA).     
             Figure III.1 Ascent GN&C Tasks                        Constraints levied were: 1) no recontact with launch pad; 
2) maintain aerodynamic loads within structural 
capability; 3) meet specific attitude and rates at SRB 
separation; 4) maintain attitude within thermal attitude 
constraint; 5) maintain axial acceleration below 3 g’s; 
6) meet specific attitude and rates at ET separation; 7) 
meet  ET disposal criteria; 8) maintain RTLS 
trajectory within fly back range and dynamic pressure 
constraints; 9) meet RTLS MECO mass constraint; 
and 10) provide modal suppression and/or attenuation 
as required for dynamic stability. Figure III.1 is a 
simplified flow diagram of the ascent task. 
 Early GN&C development focused on TVC 
command loops, propellant slosh effects, modal 
effects, incorporating day of launch wind effects, abort 
modes, manual take over, and meeting staging 
interface requirements.  
 The ascent FCS incorporates a classical 
“proportional plus derivative” feedback control law. 
Several types of digital filters are implemented on the 
rate gyro outputs to attenuate undesirable higher 
frequency components due to vehicle flexible body 
dynamics. The filter designs were a balancing act 
because the rigid body bandpass and the flexible 
vehicle dynamics were close in proximity. Another 
challenge was the requirement to ensure phase 
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stabilization of the fuel slosh dynamics which fell within the rigid body bandpass. Generally, the higher levels of 
attenuation in the flex dynamics frequency came at the expense of increased phase lag in the rigid body/slosh 
frequency range. The filters were under constant scrutiny and change due to the multitude of payloads that were 
flown.  
 The ascent thrust vector control (ATVC) command loop from the beginning required extensive analysis. It is a 
critical loop that requires knowledge of the hydraulic system, actuator characteristics, sensor characteristics, SSME 
and SRB thrust profiles, and the effects of system failures. The flight control hydraulic laboratory (FCHL) at 
Rockwell Downey was extensively used in designing the specific gains required for the TVC algorithms. This 
unique laboratory was capable of varying actuator loads, instilling hydraulic failures, and applying various system 
lags and biases. 
 A major Ascent GN&C update occurred when the super light weight tank (SLWT) was introduced. It was 15% 
less stiff than the original tank therefore affecting slosh stability margins. Changes were made to the controller 
filters, a slosh/flex coupling term was added, and the removal of a slosh induced moment term in the roll equation of 
motion. This is a prime example of a system that evolves, in this case it was the external tank, and the effects it had 
on the controller filters and gains. 
 Separation dynamics was another region that required extensive analysis and G&C updates. During SRB 
separation it became a necessity to fire the forward Orbiter RCS jets in order to prevent window contamination from 
the SRB separation motors. Also, when new SRB separation motors were installed further analysis was required to 
insure no new dynamics were being introduced. ET separation was another region that required updates and 
extensive analysis. The main concern was recontact when there was an RCS jet failure, especially during an RTLS 
abort. Changes were made to timers, gains, and jet select logic. 
 
On-orbit GN&C 
The On-orbit GN&C (OGNC) system significantly leveraged the capabilities developed for the Apollo moon 
landings. To achieve this efficiently, the responsibility for development of the OGNC was completed under track 
task by NASA and the Draper Laboratory with oversight by prime contractor RI. The OGNC and its sister functions 
incorporated in the Transition DAP, performed all functions following MECO, on orbit operations, deorbit and 
preparations for entry. Significant flight operations included payload deployment, rendezvous and proximity 
operations and capture of free flyers with the remote manipulator system. Although it significantly leveraged the 
Apollo OGNC, the Shuttle system incorporated several new capabilities to improve operational flexibility and 
efficiency.  
The Space Shuttle navigation system leveraged the Apollo inertial state Kalman Filter with periodic state updates 
via ground uplinks, but state noise was incorporated to improve onboard covariance calculations. For relative 
navigation the techniques used for the Apollo Lunar orbit rendezvous were adapted for Earth orbit rendezvous 
including incorporating a rendezvous radar system (illustrated by figure III.2). Guidance algorithms provided the 
capability for closed-loop powered explicit 
guidance (PEG) using a linear tangent 
method and rendezvous targeting 
algorithms. The control system or Orbit 
Digital Autopilot (ODAP) expanded on 
Phase Plane reaction control system 
(illustrated by figure III.3) methods 
employed for Apollo, but incorporated 
several new features to improve thruster 
duty cycles for the reusable space vehicle. 
A Kalman filter state estimator was used to 
derive vehicle rate and disturbance 
acceleration estimates. To limit the effects 
of filter lags on rate estimation, feed-
forward estimates of expected rate changes 
due to commanded thruster firings were 
introduced into the Kalman filter. 
 
 
          Figure III.2 Shuttle Rendezvous Navigation Filter 
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Figure III.3 Orbit Phase Plane 
For all proximity operations the absence of close-in range sensors required that the crew continue to fly 
operations manually. Significant training and flight procedures were developed to provide the crew appropriate 
techniques for flying to within close proximity of payloads to allow their capture by the robotic arm. Docking was 
not a feature of the early Shuttle design. 
While the OMS TVC was adapted from Apollo, the Shuttle-unique RCS configuration with thrusters pointing 
into 14 different directions required an entirely new table look-up-based jet selection algorithm. Major modifications 
to the Apollo phase plane control loop (combined axis-by-axis attitude error and attitude rate error tracking logic) 
were needed to address Shuttle hardware and operational environment effects. Also, the primary RCS control 
included a wrap-around of the OMS TVC loop to assure that the Shuttle fault tolerance requirements were fully met.  
Some specific primary RCS control loop design challenges included: Assuring stability of the OMS TVC wrap-
around given fundamentally different OMS TVC and RCS control criteria; meeting control precision goals despite 
large minimum impulse values (driven by an 80 ms minimum thruster on time necessitated by unacceptable water 
hammer effects found to be possible in the propellant lines if shorter on/off cycle times were allowed); assuring 
sufficient control authority for the full spectrum of two-fault conditions. Some of the primary RCS fault tolerance 
demands resulted in application of novel, fault-driven, Boolean rule-based logic that directed the jet selection to 
acceptable look-up tables for specific classes of fault combinations. 
The vernier RCS control loop, in its initial flight implementation, provided a dedicated fine-rotation control loop 
that was unique to the Shuttle. Taking advantage of its configuration of 6 thrusters that pointed into six different 
directions, it used a new, and deceptively simple “dot product” selection logic that picked 1 to 3 thrusters that 
produced a combined rotational acceleration closely aligned to the desired direction of control. While vernier jets 
were only commanded when at least one rotation control axis had an error in a phase plane zone mandating jet 
activity, whenever jets were commanded, the errors in all rotation axes were included in the dot product computation 
to promote overall pointing error reduction. The criteria for selecting a second and possibly third thrusters were 
tuned to the Shuttle’s vernier RCS configuration to assure that the level of acceleration alignment improvement and 
expected phase plane error reduction from their use improved overall vehicle propellant usage efficiency. 
Another unique challenge for the OGNC developers was the requirements to provide attitude control while 
payloads were being manipulated by the Remote Manipulator System (RMS). The entire loaded RMS flexural 
frequency range was very near the open-loop cross-over frequency for the vernier RCS control system. This posed 
two problems: 1) Dynamic interaction between the structure and vernier RCS jets could excite unacceptable motion 
of the payload on the RMS. 2) High vernier RCS duty cycles could result from attempts to actively control the 
system. The first problem was recognized before any RMS flight operations occurred on the Shuttle, which led to 
careful screening, using high fidelity simulations with extended RMS structural models, of each planned 
RMS/extended payload configurations that planned to apply closed-loop vernier RCS attitude control. The second 
problem was only fully appreciated after the vernier RCS experienced excessive duty cycles on the STS-2 flight due 
in part to its use for closed-loop attitude control during commanded RMS motion with an extended payload.  
Subsequent flight procedures precluded closed-loop RCS attitude control during any commanded RMS motion 
which remained in effect for the life of the Shuttle. 
The initial Shuttle flights also identified unique challenges for the OGNC.  On the first 4 Shuttle missions, at the 
completion of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) burn, but before ET separation, the engine bells were slewed 
to their planned reentry positions at a frequency that turned out to be very close to a subharmonic of the rocking 
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frequency of the orbiter on the ET (despite pre-flight predictions to the contrary).  Oscillatory orbiter motion excited 
by the SSME slewing caused rhythmic firing of the primary RCS jets in response to apparent cyclic 
violation/satisfaction of pre-separation rate limits. While the ET separation was successful on all the Shuttle flights, 
it occurred with much less safety margin than was originally intended on the first four flights until modifications 
could be made to rectify the problem. 
During early flights analysis was also completed to determine the effects of the self impingement of the thruster 
plumes on the Orbiter surfaces. Early flights did not model the impact of the Body Flap on the aft down-firing 
vernier thrusters resulting in nearly 50% error in thrust estimation and significant increases in thruster duty cycle 
rates due to mis-modeled feed forward predictions and resultant errors in estimation of the disturbance accelerations.  
On STS-3 the plume was accounted for and significant improvements were observed. Ironically, these models 
appeared accurate until the first Shuttle/Mir docking flights when it was discovered that the errors still existed in the 
resultant X-axis of the jets which became observable with the significant shift in the mated stack Z center of gravity. 
On STS-9, a test operation was conducted to demonstrate precise pointing with the primary thrusters. These 
operations uncovered an unmodeled lag in the IMU measurements which resulted in significant dual-pulse thruster 
firings at extremely high frequencies. The precise pointing operations were restricted using the Primary RCS until a 
software fix could be employed several years later. 
 
Entry through Landing GN&C 
    The initial shuttle guidance algorithms for entry through landing (E/L) were the products of various NASA and 
contractor disciplines. Entry guidance used during Major Mode 304 (i.e., post deorbit to the Terminal Area Energy 
Management (TAEM) interface) was primarily developed by NASA’s Mission Planning and Analysis Division 
(MPAD) with support from Rockwell International’s (RI) trajectory performance group. TAEM guidance then used 
to guide the orbiter to the Approach/Land (A/L) interface was primarily a McDonnell Douglas output with support 
from RI’s Integrated Entry Guidance, Navigation and Control (IGN&C) group. A/L guidance used for landing was 
developed by Sperry Flight Systems with again support from RI’s Entry IGN&C and Entry Flight Control groups. 
The only other entry related guidance function was the Glide Return to Launch Site (GRTLS) TAEM guidance. This 
latter function used only for aborts took advantage of the entry TAEM guidance scheme with added functions for 
handling the initial portion of descent post external tank separation. This guidance function was a joint product of 
NASA Engineering, McDonnell Douglas and RI. The actual E/L guidance requirements to be implemented by the 
Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) developer were then specified by Book 1 of RI’s published Functional 
Subsystem Software Requirements (FSSR) documents. These requirements were also used to derive the E/L 
guidance to be implemented for the Backup Flight System (BFS) as were specified by a BFS Program Requirements 
Document (PRD). One notable omission for the BFS was A/L guidance. 
   Of the E/L guidance functions mentioned, the Entry guidance nominal end-of-mission (EOM) requirements have 
remained pretty much intact since first baselined. The most significant change made after initial baseline and prior to 
first flight was implementation of a so-called “alpha modulation” capability. This change allowed the pitch channel 
alpha command to have some small degree of variability rather than reflect a fixed alpha vs. relative velocity profile. 
This change gave the guidance an improved drag modulation capability especially if faced with transient conditions. 
Later in the shuttle program, Entry guidance was modified to enable an auto contingency Transatlantic Abort 
Landing (TAL) capability. Note that this contingency abort capability is not applicable to the BFS. 
   The TAEM and GRTLS TAEM guidance functions underwent likely the most significant change since first 
baselined when so-called Optional TAEM Targeting (OTT) was implemented for first use on STS-5. Prior to OTT, 
use of a Heading Alignment Cylinder (HAC) was employed to align the vehicle’s heading with the runway. The 
vehicle would be steered to intercept the HAC and then commanded to follow the circumference (circle in ground 
plane) until runway alignment achieved. This targeting would always have the HAC turn be less than 180 degrees. 
A desire to have an improved weather avoidance capability led to 
the requirements implementation of OTT.  This change allowed 
for HAC turns greater than 180 degrees (“overhead approach”) 
with an option to revert to the prior guidance capability for a less 
than 180 degree (“straight-in”) approach. To accommodate the 
higher velocity HAC intercept conditions seen for overhead 
approaches, the HAC itself was redefined to be a cone (spiral in 
ground plane). The change from a cylinder to a cone allowed 
continued use of the HAC acronym. (illustrated by figure III.4) 
       Figure III.4 Heading Alignment Cone 
  The most significant change made later in the program as applicable to both Entry and GRTLS TAEM was 
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implementation of the so-called “smart speedbrake” change.  This change allowed the closed-loop speedbrake 
command to use the same energy/weight reference employed to limit Nz pitch commands.   
  A/L guidance remains near identical to its initial operational definition.  The only significant change was 
implementing an enhanced speedbrake controller meant to take into account factors affecting touchdown energy 
such as vehicle weight, sensed winds, density altitude, runway aim point and runway length. 
  As stated previously, A/L guidance is not present in the BFS. Since A/L guidance was meant to provide an auto 
landing capability, this aspect was not available with BFS since the BFS must be flown manually during entry. The 
BFS maintains TAEM guidance down to the where A/L would command Preflare (altitude of 2000 feet). From that 
point on the crew must rely on out-the-window cues for achieving touchdown with BFS. 
  The entry digital auto pilot (DAP) consists of an auto and manual mode selectable by axis, bodyflap and/or 
speebrake. For example, a possible combination is: auto pitch axis with manual lateral axis, auto speedbrake and 
manual bodyflap. Control stick steering (CSS) is the manual mode that is a rate command system with a rate 
damping stability loop similar to what the auto system uses. Auto mode replaces the RHC generated rate commands 
with command rates computed from body roll angle errors in the lateral axis and angle of attack or Nz errors in the 
pitch axis depending on flight phase. Figure III.5 is a simplified pitch axis diagram. All three axis are of similar 
design consisting of: 1) rate command logic; 2) gains and filters; 3) trim logic; 4) bending filters; and 5) effector 
command with limiters.  
          Figure III.5 Simplified Pitch Axis 
Preliminary DAP design began in 1975 with work divided into the high Mach region (entry) and the terminal 
area/landing. The transition point was a moving target during the early design years with Mach 2.5 finally being 
agreed upon. Some early DAP design drivers were: aerodynamic uncertainties, RCS uncertainties, GPC limitations, 
lateral trim, flex body suppression, and pilot induced oscillation (PIO) suppression.  
Aerodynamic uncertainties and data used to design the bending filters resulted in STS-1 flying with unique 
switches that allowed the pilot to modify the entry FCS real time. The switch functions would: 1) increase or reduce 
the forward loop gains on the aileron, rudder and elevator; 2) eliminate stability loop rate feedback; 3) add a angle of 
attack bias to the turn coordination logic; 4) freeze all aerodynamic surfaces; and 5) activate a no-yawjet lateral 
control logic. Aerodynamic uncertainties were also major factors when the rudder/speedbrake was to be activated, 
elevon scheduling, and the body flap schedule. Rudder activation was set at Mach 3.5 for STS-1 and later changed 
to Mach 5.0 only after several flight detailed test objectives (DTO’s) were performed reducing the aero 
uncertainties.  
Due to the PIO seen on the last approach/land flight test (ALT) changes were incorporated into the FCS to 
mitigate the probability of it occurring. First change was the elevator priority rate limiting (PRL) that prevented one 
axis from locking another axis out. PRL logic is a necessity due to limited rate capability of the Orbiter actuation 
system. A second modification doubled the RHC sampling rate from 12.5 to 25 samples per second. This effectively 
reduced the computer transport lag. Transport lag was significant contributor to the PIO. Next a nonlinear filter was 
applied to the RHC output to attenuate oscillatory inputs and the pitch forward gain was reduced. 
Bending filter modifications were applied to all three axes. For the pitch axis only the filter coefficients were 
changed however structural changes were made to the roll and yaw axis. In the yaw axis separate fourth order filters 
were created for the yaw jets and rudder. This took advantage of a new yaw jet minimum on time thereby reducing 
required attenuation resulting in changes to the yaw jet bending filter coefficients. For the roll axis a separate fourth 
order bending filter was added to the roll jets. The aileron loop created a second order filter for subsonic flight, a 
sixth order filter for 1.0 < Mach < 3.5, and a different sixth order filter for Mach > 3.5. Due to the lower dynamic 
pressure a large aileron forward loop gain is required for Mach > 3.5 to achieve the desired transient response. The 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
11 
higher gain requires an increase in the filter attenuation of the flex modes. In the lower supersonic region the gain is 
lower therefore a reduced attenuation is required resulting in rigid body phase lag reduction. 
Other pre-STS-1 modifications included an increase in the rudder forward loop gain; modifications to the lateral 
trim loop and turn coordination, and removal of a boosted lateral acceleration signal feedback from the yaw axis and 
the steady state signal from the roll axis. 
 
Preflight Test Operations 
  E/L GN&C requirements were tested through basically a two-step process.  The initial stage involved almost 
exclusively non-real-time (NRT) mathematical model simulations focusing on defined requirements and 
capabilities. Multiple independent simulations were involved and included both 3 degree-of-freedom (3DoF) and 6 
degree-of-freedom (6DoF) capabilities. Additionally, there were 6DoF man-in-the-loop simulations to enable 
assessments of cockpit operations and manual flying. Both nominal and stress tests were repeatedly performed to 
ascertain strengths and weaknesses inherent in the proposed GN&C architecture and algorithms. Arising from this 
initial efforts were optimal trajectory profiles for achieving desired performance goals while maintaining system and 
vehicle constraints across the breadth of potential conditions to be encountered. Additionally, stability analyses were 
performed for the guidance and FCS as independent entities and as an integrated system to insure classic gain and 
phase margins were maintained across the spectrum of defined trajectory profiles and flight envelopes. These early 
tests did uncover weaknesses whether functional of relative to performance leading to GN&C design changes to 
correct or at least mitigate the identified concerns. Once actual flight software was developed and delivered by the 
PASS and BFS S/W contractors, this software was then tested in a sophisticated real-time, man-in-the-loop 
laboratory environment at RI’s Flight Simulation Laboratory (FSL) in support of E/L GN&C verification. It was 
through this myriad of test and evaluation activities that led to confidence in the fundamental GN&C design. This 
strategy is something that seemingly is a critical element to any downstream design activity. 
 
IV. Upgrading to Improve Safety, Reduce Operations and Extend Capability 
Following the Challenger Accident a series of upgrades were made to improve the safety of the Space Shuttle 
operations. These were followed by improvements that reduced flight operations and/or extended the capabilities of 
the GN&C system to meet future operational needs, primarily the assembly of the International Space Station. 
 
Aborts 
Prior to STS-1 the need for a trans-Atlantic intact abort (TAL) was evident. A manual procedure was developed 
for STS-1 and STS-2 that evolved into an automated mode for STS-3 and subsequent missions. The TAL transition 
occurs at MM104 (illustrated in figure IV.1) after the main propulsion system dump. The Orbiter GPC’s are loaded 
with the MM304 software during which the Orbiter is in free drift with no active control. At the start of a TAL the 
Orbiter attitude is similar to a GRTLS attitude meaning a low angle of attack thus requiring a similar pull-up 
maneuver. The entry 
DAP was modified by 
increasing the pitch rate 
gain to improve the pull-
up maneuver, a TAL 
alpha error gain was 
added, and the alpha error 
lag-lead filter was 
deactivated until Mach 
20. Additional changes 
were made to guidance 
that is TAL unique. 
         Figure IV.1 TAL 
For GRTLS TAEM, a late program functionality addition was providing an automatic contingency abort 
capability named East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL). Note that this contingency abort capability is not applicable to 
the BFS. 
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Landing/Rollout 
 Two significant modifications to the landing rollout system can be attributed to two flight incidents. The STS-3 
“wheelie” and the blown tire on STS-51D. The STS-3 “wheelie” occurred during derotation after main tire 
touchdown. After touchdown the nose derotation was greater than anticipated therefore the pilot pulled back on the 
RHC slightly with no response whereby he increased the RHC input. The Orbiter pitched up quickly (i.e. wheelie) 
causing the pilot to put a full forward RHC command into the system. Post flight analysis indicated Orbiter response 
was due to low gain on the elevator proportional 
loop in addition linear analysis showed the system 
was not stable at low pitch angles. Control loop 
changes included an increase in elevator loop gain 
and the addition of an integral term (illustrated in 
figure IV.2). The modified CSS loop is similar in 
structure to the auto loop. The new slap down 
control loop was first flown on STS-9 with no 
further incidents.           
 
     Figure IV.2 Derotation Logic 
 Prior to STS-61A differential braking provided lateral steering during rollout. During the rollout of STS-51D one 
of the main tires blew caused mainly by the overheating of the brakes resulting from the differential braking. 
Modifications to the Orbiter nose wheel steering (NWS) required upgrades to the rudder pedal transducers, new 
hardware to measure the nosewheel position and feed it back to the GPC, NWS software addition to detect failures 
(transition to caster mode), and the change from an open loop to a closed loop lateral acceleration feedback system. 
Several years later the nosewheel steering was upgraded by adding a second nosewheel command path for 
redundancy. The upgrade removed the manual direct mode. 
 A drag chute was added to the Orbiter to improve landing capability. Drag chute benefits include reduced 
stopping distance, less aggressive braking, reduced main gear loads, and a more benign derotation rate thus 
decreasing slap down loads. To ensure the drag chute cleared the SSME bells during deployment software logic was 
added to lower the SSME bells during entry. This also required an update to the priority rate limiting (PRL) logic.  
 
Day of Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU) 
The original DOLILU (1991) process re-centered the ascent trajectory by updating the guidance algorithms. 
DOLILU II (1995) updated both the ascent guidance algorithms and the first stage SSME throttle profile. DOLILU 
II eliminated the need for mission specific reconfiguration of first stage flight design I-loads and improved launch 
probability by defining dynamic pressure more accurately on the day of launch. Day of launch (DOL) I-loads are 
generated from the measured winds and atmosphere of the L-4 and L-2 atmospheric balloons. 
 
Rendezvous and Docking 
In the late eighties it was identified that the Space Shuttle ability to capture and in the future dock with target 
spacecraft could be improved if recent advances in LIDAR technology were incorporated. This desire resulted in the       
Figure IV.3  Piloting Aid System Overview 
NASA in-house development of the Trajectory Control 
Sensor (TCS). These developments led to a series of  
                   Figure IV.4  RPOP Trajectory Display 
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upgrades to the proximity operations and approach capabilities of the Orbiter, albeit never incorporating 
Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking due to the single-string nature of the TCS and the costs required to fully 
integrate the new sensor hardware into the data processing system. 
To fully utilize the TCS and Hand-held LIDARS (HHL) used for later missions, the Rendezvous and Proximity 
Operations Program (RPOP) was developed. RPOP utilized a laptop PC tied into the TCS through a downlink 
communication box and employed situational awareness tools to aid Shuttle crews during proximity operations and 
approach. RPOP incorporated sophisticated guidance and navigation software that provided tools for the crew to 
visualize the approach trajectory and provide precise range and range rate information for precise rate docking 
(illustrated in Figures IV.3&4). 
 
 
Space Station Assembly 
During the early development phase of the OGNC it was discovered that deploying large (>8K lb) payloads on 
the Shuttle RMS caused undesired interactions between the Shuttle control system and the vehicle dynamics.  As 
NASA began to investigate building Space Station Freedom and subsequently the International Space Station (ISS), 
additional dynamic interaction problems were identified. The OGNC went through a systematic series of upgrades 
to the flight control system to enable these challenging missions. These upgrades were responsible for the success of 
several Shuttle flights, including the Hubble Servicing missions, the Shuttle/Mir docking missions, the Space Radar 
Topography mission and finally the assembly of the ISS. The upgrades addressed a wide range of problems 
including operability, controllability, stability and induced loads. These efforts, combined with the improvements 
made for rendezvous and docking have developed many necessary features to enable subsequent potentially 
challenging mission operations (Table IV.1). 
Table IV.1 – Shuttle Assembly Flight Control Upgrades 
Title Function Description 
Alt PRCS Loads Implemented load efficient pulsing of the PRCS jets to enable 
control with reduced structural loads. 
Minimum Angle Jet 
Selection 
Control Improved control by aligning resultant acceleration with desired 
acceleration 
Notch Filters Stability Provided stability by minimizing structurally induced feedback in 
the rate estimate 
Reboost Operability, Loads Provided an automated reboost operation within structural loads 
Feed Forward Control, Stability Improved performance when using the Notch Filters 
Onboard Mass Props Operability Calculated thruster accelerations onboard to simplify uplink of the 
vehicle configuration 
 
V.   Flight Experience 
 
Shuttle/MIR 
The Shuttle/Mir program was developed to demonstrate the ability of NASA and the Russian Space Agency to 
work together as concepts of the ISS were developed. In addition to the 
geopolitical benefits this program provided an excellent proving grounds for 
many GN&C capabilities necessary for assembly of the ISS.   
The Shuttle/Mir program provided the first opportunity for a Shuttle to dock 
(picture V.1) with another space vehicle.  Operational and engineering 
techniques were developed to routinely perform docking.  The OGNC upgrades 
developed to enable rendezvous and docking were matured and demonstrated.  
Several techniques for Vbar and Rbar dockings were proven and refined.  
Analysis techniques for plume impingement from Shuttle approach firings were 
developed and proven through tests, including the ability to adapt to 
modifications in the flight operations.  The post-contact docking technique and 
software were developed, implemented and tested in a rapid cycle to enable the 
 Picture V.1 Shuttle/Mir Docked    first docking flight.  
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
14 
All of the OGNC upgrades developed to enable assembly of large structures in orbit were tested and proven on 
the Shuttle/Mir flights. From the very initial operations following the first docking the upgrades were relied upon to 
provide stable flight control of the largest structure ever flown in space to that date. Additionally, test operations 
were performed that demonstrated all of the upgrades including the Alt PRCS mode and jet selection upgrade. 
The Shuttle/Mir flights provided an excellent proving ground to make routine many of the OGNC capabilities 
necessary to enable the assembly of the ISS.  
 
ISS Assembly 
The ISS assembly missions, occurring over more than ten years, demonstrated the flexibility of the Space Shuttle 
GN&CA multitude of missions were completed utilizing a GN&C system that had evolved and matured over its 
thirty year life to complete a series of missions never 
envisioned by the original designers. The OGNC 
went through a significant series of upgrades to 
enable stable control, while meeting significant peak 
and life load constraints.  Significant operational 
flexibility was incorporated to accommodate the 
wide range of assembly configurations. Operational 
flexibility of DOLILU increased launch probability 
and robustness was incorporated to deal with many 
operational changes, like rendezvous on Flight 2A 
with the Node already mated to the Orbiter, 
controlling with partially deployed solar arrays on 
4A and providing backup control when the ISS 
temporarily lost its redundant Russian Computer 
Complex.  The assembly of the ISS offers the 
pinnacle in demonstration of the Shuttle GN&C 
capabilities. (picture V.2) 
Picture V.2 Orbiter/Space Station Assembly Complete 
 
VI.   Lessons Learned 
 
Flight Test Program - Flight tests with proper instrumentation are crucial to thoroughly validate a vehicle’s 
operational viability. The lesson learned from Shuttle is without a proper flight test program reaching the goal of 
“operational” is slow and costly. Due to the lack of a “standard” flight test program early Orbiter flights required a 
set of programmed test inputs (PTI’s) to verify the entry aerodynamic database and expand the longitudinal center of 
gravity. PTI’s were flown through STS-51F. Due to crew safety the aggressiveness of the PTI’s were tempered and 
the lack of proper flight test sensors hampered the post test analysis. A major system that never was verified by a 
flight test was the autoland system.  
 
Independent Primary and Backup Flight Systems – The concept was worthy of it’s time however it also proved 
to be a major validation and verification effort. The BFS was to be flown manually, it was single string, and the 
transition from PFS to BFS was to be seemless. Lesson learned was the tremendeous effort to validate and verify 
Orbiter control during the transition from PFS to BFS. It was not as seemless as first invisoned.  
 
Use of Uncertainties – The use of uncertainties in the design, analysis, and verification process is a necessity. The 
lesson learned from Shuttle is need to use uncertainties or risk catastrophic results.  
 
Functional evolution – The GN&C system functionally expanded as the program progressed. Lesson learned is the 
need to have a GN&C architecture that can be functionally expanded. Examples for Shuttle: addition of a drag 
chute, active nosewheel steering and the inability to add sensors to the wheel/strut, DAP and guidance algorithm 
additions/modifications, and adding additional manual command and control capabilities. In some cases 
compromises were required because there was no way to add sensors to the system. Costly to add after the fact. 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
15 
Early prototypes, development and Integration – Over the course of the Shuttle development significant 
capabilities were developed to allow early prototype and simulation of new GN&C capabilities.  These early efforts 
have been essential to the successful implementation of new capabilities into the vehicle. 
  
Early Evaluation of Software Sizing – Although the Shuttle processing capabilities are minimal by today’s 
capabilities it was intended to be very capable during early development.  Still expected software functionality 
exceeding the capabilities and a software scrub was conducted prior to first flight.  Current programs need to be 
aware that software functionality needs to be appropriately managed within the capabilities of the processing 
elements. 
  
Program objectives will evolve – The OGNC underwent extensive evolution to perform all of the objectives over 
the life of the program.  A modular approach to the functionality had been developed which allowed for reasonable 
incremental upgrades.  Any new program is likely to face changes in objectives over an extended life and care 
should be taken to accommodate evolution through modular architecture and implementation. 
  
Early Flight Data – Early Shuttle flights encountered unexpected flight environments and demonstrated the 
significant benefits of obtaining flight test data.  Additionally, anomaly resolution has demonstrated the need for 
extensive downlist and recorded data to resolve issues and the flexible reconfigurable data configurations have been 
essential. 
 
VII.   Conclusion 
With wheel-stop at KSC of the STS-135 mission, the Space Shuttle completed a storied career. The program 
achievements were many and varied, including the first reusable space transportation system, servicing of the 
Hubble Space Telescope and assembly of the International Space Station. The GN&C system contributed 
significantly to the success of the Space Shuttle program through its versatility, robustness and capability. The 
development of the Shuttle GN&C system leveraged many prior efforts, such as the Apollo OGNC, as well as set 
the stage for a next generation of GN&C capability. The Shuttle GN&C development efforts created an algorithm, 
simulation and analysis base that continues to be leveraged by GN&C developers today. The evolution and upgrades 
to the GN&C over the past three decades have contributed significantly to the program success, but also have 
provided a proving ground for new technologies and capabilities. The operational flexibility of the GN&C was 
demonstrated time again through the difficult missions it was asked to accomplish. Additionally, significant test and 
verification techniques have been developed using modern tools and capabilities which can be leveraged to enable 
future programs.  Finally, The Shuttle GN&C provided significant lessons learned that can be applied to future space 
transportation systems, such as being proposed by the Commercial Crew Development program. 
For the many people who had the pleasure to participate in the development, evolution and operation of the Shuttle 
GN&C the past three decades have been an exciting time. Many organizations and individuals have contributed to 
the success of the GN&C and great pride can be taken in what has been accomplished and the contributions made to 
laying the ground work for future human spaceflight missions. 
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Overview
• GN&C Background
• GN&C Development 
• GN&C Evolution
• Mission Milestones/Accomplishments
• Lessons Learned
• Summary
GN&C Background – Team Approach
• Shuttle GN&C Developed through MODE team approach
– Multiple organizations co-developing systems and operations
• Team Included
– NASA – GN&C MODE Team Leads
– Rockwell International/Boeing – Prime Contractor
– Draper Laboratory – Orbit GNC Development/BFS
– IBM – Flight Software
– Honeywell, McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed Martin
GNC Background – Flight Operations
Aborts
GN&C Background - Systems
OMS Engines
TVC
RCS Engines
Located Fwd and Aft
Payload Bay
•Rendezvous Radar
•Trajectory Control Sensor
•Star Tracker
Nose Wheel Steering
Drag Chute
Rudder/Speed Brake
Body Flap
Elevon/Aileron
GNC Background – Operational Sequences
GN&C Development Objectives
• Primary design drivers: Crew safety and Mission success
• FO/FS architecture
• Manual/Auto modes
• Independent backup flight system
• Digital fly-by-wire controller
• Abort capability
• On Orbit “fine” pointing control
• Payload deployment, rendezvous and proximity operations, 
capture of free flyers with remote manipulator system
• Latter objective: ISS assembly and ISS stack control
GN&C Development Objectives
GNC Development - Ascent
• Primary function to deliver vehicle to orbit
– Meet insertion criteria
– Accommodate various abort scenarios
• Significant vehicle constraints
1) no re-contact with launch pad; 
2) maintain aerodynamic loads with structural 
capability; 
3) meet specific attitude and rates at SRB separation; 
4) maintain attitude within thermal attitude constraint; 
5) maintain axial acceleration below 3 g’s;
6) meet specific attitude and rates at ET separation;
7) meet  ET disposal criteria; 
8) maintain RTLS trajectory within fly back range 
and dynamic pressure constraints; 
9)  RTLS MECO mass constraint;
10) provide modal suppression and/or attenuation as 
required for dynamic stability
GNC Development - Orbit
• Development significantly leveraged 
Apollo GN&C development
– Completed via a Track Task to 
NASA/Draper Lab
• Primary Functions
– Insertion/Deorbit
– Attitude Control/Pointing
– Rendezvous and Capture
– Orbital Maneuvers
• Key Development Items
– RCS thruster control
– TVC control for burns
– Relative Navigation for Rendezvous
– Stability with deployed payloads (RMS 
and directly mated)
– ET Separation
Shuttle Phase Plane Control Law
Shuttle Relative Navigation Filter
GN&C Development - Entry
• Entry Development Team
– NASA, Rockwell (Boeing), Sperry (HI), 
MD(Boeing)
• Primary functions
– Thermal management
– Energy management
– Approach and Landing
– Accommodate abort landings
• Key Development Items
– A/L & Energy Mgmt Guidance
– Speed brake Mgmt
– Auto/Manual flight control
– Aero robustness
– PIO robustness
– Bending filters
• Significant flight test through ALT flights
Heading Alignment Cone
Approach and Landing
GNC Evolution - Aborts
• Aborts
– Automation of Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL)
– Addition of Contingency Abort (post Challenger accident)
• East Coast Abort Landing (ECAL): intact east coast emergency landing
• In-flight Crew Escape System (ICES): bailout mode
– Modified autopilot to hold angle of attack at 15 degrees
GNC Evolution – Entry GN&C
• Entry Flight Control
– Active nosewheel steering
– Addition of drag chute
– “Smart” speedbrake FSW modifications for HAC wind energy 
management
– Implementation of Optional TAEM Targeting (OTT); allowed HAC turns 
greater than 180 degrees
– Wraparound DAP modification: reduce RCS propellant usage, optimized 
aero control with limited or no yaw RCS capability (no Yaw Jet mode)
– Multitude of  modifications to gain schedules, filters, and effector on/off 
transition logic
– Addition of GPS
GNC Evolution – ISS Assembly OFCS
Title Function Description
Alt PRCS Loads Implemented load efficient pulsing of the PRCS jets 
to enable control with reduced structural loads. 
Minimum Angle Jet 
Selection 
Control Improved control by aligning resultant acceleration 
with desired acceleration 
Notch Filters Stability Provided stability by minimizing structurally induced 
feedback in the rate estimate 
Reboost Operability, Loads Provided an automated reboost operation within 
structural loads 
Feed Forward Control, Stability Improved performance when using the Notch Filters 
Onboard Mass Props Operability Calculated thruster accelerations onboard to simplify 
uplink of the vehicle configuration 
• Orbit flight control system upgrades for ISS assembly addressed 
issues with operability, controllability, stability and induced 
loads
GNC Evolution – Rendezvous & Docking
• Development of the Trajectory Control Sensor (TCS)
• Utilization of hand held LIDARS
• Development of the Rendezvous and Proximity Operations 
Program (RPOP)
 PGSC
NAVIGATION DISPLAY
GPC
Pilot
CONTROL
COAS
Radar
PGSC
TCS Command & Display Software
TCS
HandHeld
LIDAR
PGSC
Keyboard
GuidanceNavigation Display
Rendezvous & Prox Ops Program
CCTV
IMU
PC Decommutation
Software
Shuttle GN&C Data
GN&C Key Events
ALT Flight Test STS-1 Launch Orbiter/MIR Docked
STS-49 Drag Chute
STS-61 Hubble Capture Shuttle/ISS Control
GN&C Lessons Learned
• Program objectives will evolve: accommodate GN&C evolution through 
modular architecture and implementation 
• Flight Test program: without a proper flight test program reaching the goal 
of “operational” is slow and costly 
• Early evaluation of flight software sizing: expected software functionality 
exceeded capabilities and a software scrub was conducted prior to first 
flight. Current programs need to be aware that software functionality needs to 
be appropriately managed within the capabilities of the processing elements.
• Early prototypes, development and integration: Over the course of the 
Shuttle development significant capabilities were developed to allow early 
prototype and simulation of new GN&C capabilities. These early efforts have 
been essential to the successful implementation of new capabilities into the 
vehicle
• Independently designed primary and backup flight systems: the 
tremendous effort to validate and verify Orbiter control during the transition 
from PFS to BFS. It was not as seamless as first envisioned. 
Summary
• Thirty years of successful flight
• First reusable space transportation system
• First all Fly-by-Wire space transportation control system
• Operational flexibility of GN&C demonstrated through thirty 
years of expanded mission requirements
• Created an algorithm, simulation, and analysis library that 
continues to be leveraged by GN&C developers today
• Shuttle provided a “proving ground” for new technologies and 
capabilities that can be utilized on future spacecraft
